PRIVATE ORDERING AND ORPHAN WORKS:
OUR LEAST WORST HOPE?
KEITH PORCARO 1

ABSTRACT
The political capture of copyright law by industry groups
has inadvertently led to orphan works problems arising in less
organized industries, such as publishing. Google Book Search
(GBS) is a prime example of how private ordering can
circumvent legislative inefficiencies. Digital technologies such
as GBS can open up a new business model for publishers and
other content industries, centered around aggregated rights
holdings. However, the economic inertia that private ordering
represents may pose a threat to the knowledge-oriented goals of
copyright law.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Congress has been accused of many things, but initiative is
generally not one of them. The current state of copyright law, with wildly
longer term limits and automatic protection, is a result of continuous
content-industry lobbying to protect their valuable, aging intellectual
property. As a result, the problem of orphan works—where copyright
holders are untraceable, and strict liability prevents the work’s further
use—has arisen, particularly in less centralized industries, such as
publishing. Private ordering offers an path around the Sisyphean task of
legislative change, as parties seek to optimize economic benefit through
private contracting or settlement.

Google Book Search (GBS) is a prime example of such ordering
at work. GBS holds promise as potentially being able to surmount the
orphan works problem, leveraging Google’s financial might to assume
the liability risks. Google also has the potential to redefine the
publishing industry model, creating a payment modeled around small
access payments from a large library of archived works. However, this
model has potentially worrisome implications for the state of copyright
law and for the future of the public domain.
¶2
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I. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PRESSURE GROUPS
¶3
The emergence of so-called “pressure groups”—political
organisms designed to promote particular economic interests—is
arguably the most significant development in American politics in the
last century. 2 Their emergence has called into question the independence
of the “public interest” from private economic interests.3 The growth of
government results in increased “differential or discriminatory impact on
the separate and identifiable groups of the population,” which
incentivizes investment in obtaining favorable differential gains through
political lobbying. 4 Buchanan and Tullock explain the cyclical nature of
this relationship: “[t]he organized pressure group thus arises because
differential advantages are expected to be secured through the political
process, and in turn, differential advantages for particular groups are
produced because of the existence of organized activity.” 5 In other
words, the success of one organized pressure group successfully
disrupting the prior “general welfare” equilibrium incentivizes further
collective action, as more groups look to capture their political interest
niche. 6 Economic theory suggests this will eventually lead to a new
equilibrium, given full organization.7 This new balance—assuming it
exists—does not mean that discriminatory legislation will cease to be
adopted. 8 Interest group activity is a function of net profit expected from
the political process. 9 Given unequal power balances within particular
market segments, pressure groups can secure legislation that provides
benefits that “are not applied generally to the whole population.”10
¶4
This power imbalance manifests in modern copyright law. The
consolidation and growth of copyright-reliant industries has not been met
with a suitably large political counterweight.11 The result is a spiral
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effect, where copyright laws have become increasingly more beneficial
to interested pressure groups. 12

II. COPYRIGHT EXPANSION AND ORPHAN WORKS
¶5
Over the past half-century, content industries have gained
control of the legislative pipeline for copyright to a degree likely
unsurpassed by any other modern cartel. 13 The 1976 Copyright Act , for
instance, was entirely drafted through a series of negotiations—at the
urging of the U.S. Copyright Office—between authors, publishers, and
other content owners. 14 More recently, the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act (CTEA) pitted studios and publishing interests, led
by Disney, against a coalition of “college professors, constitutional
lawyers, librarians[,] and small town school teachers.” 15 Since the 1960s,
Congress has expanded the copyright term eleven times, after expanding
it just twice from 1790 to 1960. 16 The economic size of the copyright
industries should not be understated: At the time of the CTEA’s passage,
they made up nearly six percent of American gross domestic product,
and one of the U.S.’s largest exports. 17 Disney in particular stood to lose
control of billions of dollars worth of copyrights— Mickey Mouse and
Winnie-the-Pooh alone were valued at nearly $8 billion dollars each—if
the CTEA was not passed. 18 In simple terms, the cartel-like organization
of the content industries, coupled with a lack of an economically
significant lobbying opponent, has led copyright inexorably down the
road of increased term protection.
¶6
As copyright protection began to expand, and particularly as it
expanded well past the death of the author, the problem of orphan works
arose. Most significant to the explosion of the orphan problem was the
dropping of the renewal requirement. This shifted copyright from an
“opt-in” system, which required content creators to actively maintain
copyright, to an “opt-out” system. 19 Thus, works that might enter the
public domain due to a low commercial value now remain covered by
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copyright. 20 With such a large population of copyrighted works, there are
some works that have nigh-untraceable origins. However, the inability to
locate a copyright holder does not protect users from the strict liability
hammer of copyright law. 21 Whatever value those works originally had
as foundational materials for other works is then lost, as future use is
chilled by the possibility of litigious parents returning to protect their
(previously valueless) orphan work. 22
¶7
The issue of orphan works arises largely as a side effect of
content-industry efforts to expand copyright protection, and lingers
largely because there is no group with a significant enough incentive to
push for such a change. Large content-providers meticulously catalogue
their copyrights, and in any event are fairly easy to track down for
licensing. 23 Orphan works generally tend to be either below their radar or
within their contingency budgets. 24 On the other hand, a creator of a
derivative work does not know that she has encountered an orphan works
problem until she actually does, and cannot find the current copyright
holder of a work she wishes to use. 25 This uncertainty surrounding
orphan works encounters inhibits the creation of an interest group to
address the issue, as the potential members of such a group are not only
nebulously defined and spread out, but also may lack the will or
wherewithal to pursue the issue further. This creates a classic problem of
collective action, in which “large collectivities with diffuse interests”
(academics, librarians, etc) are “systematically disadvantaged in the
political process as compared to smaller groups with more acute
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interests” (Big Content) because “larger groups face higher organizing
costs and are affected more severely by incentives to free ride.” 26
¶8
Further, the number of orphan works actually in existence is
virtually indiscernible. 27 The fluid social mobilization through orphan
works-related obstacles further magnifies the collective action problem.
While an orphan work issue may prevent some people from creating a
work, others may move on and utilize a substitute work, and the orphan
works problem encountered becomes untraceable. A calculation of the
orphan works population would almost invariably be reliant on the
number of unsuccessful or abandoned private searches by any and every
potential user. Further, gauging the severity of the problem would require
examining the preventive impact orphan works have on the ability to
create a new work—whether users find a substitute or just accept the risk
of suit. As such efforts to estimate the scope of orphan works problems
generally dissolve into speculation.28
¶9
Further, the scale of orphan works problems vary widely across
various content formats. 29 For instance, within the relatively consolidated
music and movie industries, a serious effort has been made to create
databases and clearinghouses which provide owner information for
copyright protected works. 30 There is abundant economic incentive in
these industries for such clearinghouses, especially in music, where the
explosion of sampling-based production enables works to be revenueproducing long after release. 31 In industries such as publishing, there is
little incentive for clearinghouses, as out of print books or artwork are
more difficult to locate and build upon.
¶10
Due to the cross-industry reach of copyright law, pressure group
lobbying from the music and movie industries has inadvertently spawned
externalities in other industries. This drag-along effect of industryneutral law is not unique to copyright. In patent law, lobbying efforts of
multiple, discordant industry groups have resulted in a tangle of law that
fails to appropriately account for the innovation models of any
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Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New
Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 811 (2008).
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Olive Huang, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding Homes
for the Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 266 (2006).
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Id.
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Id. at 267.
30
See MPAA Comment, supra note 23, at 1; RIAA Comment, supra note 23, at
1. Although each industry trade group generally recognizes potential problem
spots with regards to orphan works, each group’s position is that it is generally a
miniscule part of their population of controlled works.
31
See RIAA Comment, supra note 23, at 1.
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industry. 32 In copyright, this effect is more unidirectional, specifically in
the area of term extensions. Here, publishing has been dragged along into
a new copyright regime, without the mechanisms in place to account for
the orphan-works problem.
Recent attempts to forge legislative compromise with regards to
orphan works have been unsuccessful. 33 Graphic arts and photography
groups have strong incentive to oppose such legislation, as more often
than not, information about the creator of a work is not available on the
work itself, 34 and the amount of effort required to show a so-called
“good-faith” search would likely be quite minimal, even given modest
publicity and monetization efforts on the part of the original creator. In
short, there is little evidence that the legislative logjam will be broken,
particularly given the sweeping applicability of copyright across media
formats.
¶11

III. ORPHAN WORKS, PUBLISHING, AND KNOWLEDGE
MAINTENANCE
¶12
Within the publishing industry, the orphan works problem is
much more significant. The business of publishing is highly
decentralized, and publishers do not typically maintain long continued
relationships with the author of a given book, especially if printing is
limited to a single run. There is little business incentive to maintain a
rights database for out-of-print books, which are presumably out-of-print
because they were not profitable enough to continue printing. The
publishing industry has undergone several shifts in printing formats
before making the shift to digital formats in the mid-1980s. Many of
these pre-digital printing formats were proprietary to individual printers.
As a result, not only would a publisher likely be unable to reprint books
made before the shift to digital without significant effort, an older
publisher may not even be able to confirm that they printed a particular
book. Adding to the problem is an extremely fragmented publishing
industry, raising the possibility that a particular publishing house
(generally the most reliable way to find a rights-holder) may no longer
exist.

32

For further discussion of the problems of an industry-neutral patent system,
see generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (1999).
33
See, e.g., H.R. 5136, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006);
H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008).
34
Compare to creator information in other media, such as liner notes, metadata,
or central databases in the music industry, credit reels in the movie industry, and
publisher and author information in most books.
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¶13
Due to the uncertain character of orphan rights distribution and a
fragmented publishing industry, the most significant advocate for orphan
works legislation continues to be libraries, particularly university
libraries. From 1999 to 2001, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU)
Libraries attempted a feasibility study of digitizing their library. CMU
attempted to track down copyright owners for a random sample of books
published since 1923, with the intent of gaining permission for
digitization. 35 In their response comment to the U.S. Copyright Office’s
2005 inquiry on Orphan Works, they detail the results of their study. 36
¶14
According to a rough estimation CMU performed based on
WorldCat publication database numbers and studies done by the U.S.
Copyright Office, only 7% of book copyrights were renewed between
1923 and 1963, when protection became automatic.37 While the numbers
are not directly comparable to today, copyright renewal rates provide an
indication as to what proportion of the copyright-eligible population feel
strongly enough about the continued profitability potential of their work
to warrant the effort of preventing it from entering the public domain. 38
Renewal rates also provide a further explanation for the lack of
incentives on the part of publishers to keep track of older works – if the
works were worth copyrighting, someone would have done so. 39
¶15
For their sample, Carnegie Mellon next attempted to track down
the copyright owners of books that were not in the public domain.
Despite the original claimant being listed at the U.S. Copyright Office,
for 22% of books sampled, the publisher of a book simply could not be
found. 40 A further 11% of books were eliminated from the study because

35

Comment of the Carnegie Mellon Univ. Libraries, In re Orphan Works, No.
537 (Mar. 22, 2005), at 3,
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0537-CarnegieMellon.pdf
[hereinafter CMUL Comment].
36
Id.
37
Id. at 2.
38
Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright 2–3 (U. Chi. Dep’t L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 154, 2002),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319321
(“[F]ewer than 11% of the copyrights registered between 1883 and 1964 were
renewed at the end of their 28-year term, even though the cost of renewal was
small”).
39
It is worth noting that the U.S. Copyright Office charged Carnegie Mellon
$150 to run a title search for seven titles published between 1923 and 1963 in
order to determine if the copyrights had been renewed. Although this initial step
of investigation may not be expensive on a small scale, for a library digitization
project the step may be prohibitively expensive, an important consideration for
the future.
40
CMUL Comment, supra note 35, at 3.
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third-party copyright ownership made tracking down the proper owner
excessively complicated.41 Even when a publisher could be located, they
were either unresponsive (36%), unaware of having published older
books, lacked proper records regarding a particular work (dead-ending
the search), or unsure what rights they possessed regarding a work. 42 The
transaction costs of tracking down copyright owners in the publishing
world can be a significant deterrent,43 as can the wildly variant
restrictions and fees that publishers can demand, even for continued
access to out-of-print books. 44 A simple lack of proper rights cataloguing
can further deter users from a search—CMU averaged over 100 days per
copyright owner before an answer was received, sometimes after
multiple letters of inquiry. 45 A substantial portion of orphan works
problems in publishing may thus be a function of poor industry
organization.
¶16
Concordant with the copyright concerns is the general policy
goal of knowledge maintenance. Carnegie Mellon’s study suggests that
over half of the books published in the United States since 1923 are now
out of print. 46 Further, this wealth of knowledge is literally
disintegrating. Older books printed on non-acid-free paper will
eventually dissolve, and many out of print books are in advanced states
of decay, a process the best preservation efforts can only slow. 47 As
transaction costs and difficulty in finding copyright owners inhibit the
ability of scholars and creators to build off of these works, the
increasingly poor condition of these works will further deter their use.
The fragile nature of books demands a solution not only in copyright law
but also in digitization. Current copyright law stifles efforts to digitize,

41

Id.
Id. at 3–4.
43
See CMUL Comment, supra note 35, at 5 (noting the $78 transaction cost per
title in a separate study seeking to digitize 278 rare books, which did not include
“the cost of consultations with university legal counsel, creating the database,
managing the project, or intermittent labor costs in 2004 invested in locating and
finalizing negotiations with some authors and estates.”).
44
It is worth noting, as a purely speculative point, there is significant incentive
for publishers to err on the side of claiming copyright for a past work,
particularly in the context of a library digitization project, which would
essentially provide the opportunity to re-monetize every book that publisher has
ever printed. The difficulty of each individual transaction combined with the
scale of many transactions on the part of the library (or scholar) would almost
guarantee that the potential licensee would never be able to second-guess the
copyright status of the publishing house.
45
CMUL Comment, supra note 35, at 5.
46
See id. at 6. Estimation extrapolated from figure on page.
47
See id. at 6.
42

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 015

preserve, or use many of these rapidly expiring works. Ultimately, this
magnifies orphan works problems to scales worthy of attracting
attention. The digital era has arrived in time to allow preservation of the
rapidly expanding printed record. Orphan works underscore the fact that
this preservation effort’s largest obstacle is not technological, but legal;
an ironic reality, given copyright’s constitutionally stated purpose of
promoting knowledge.
¶17
The digitization of the world’s printed knowledge, or even the
libraries of a dozen major universities, eventually boils down to an issue
of scale. Anything that was last printed before the mid-1980s—still some
10 million books—will likely need to be manually scanned, due to a lack
of transferrable digital form.

IV. ENTER GOOGLE
¶18
Google hardly needs an introduction. Far and away the most
successful company of the late-1990s tech boom, Google has a self
professed mission “to organize the world’s information and make it
universally accessible and useful.”48 All of this data is used as a driver
for Google’s market-dominating internet advertising engine. In October
2004, the company launched Google Books—then called Google Print,
and began digitally scanning books from publishers and university
libraries. In October 2009, Google announced that they had scanned their
10 millionth book. 49 Depending on the copyright status, users are
permitted to search within books and view excerpts of a few pages
surrounding their search term. Google’s effort brought them a lawsuit
from the Author’s Guild and five major publishing companies—McGraw
Hill, Pearson, Penguin, Simon & Schuster, and John Wiley and Sons. As
of this writing, the settlement is still being negotiated.
¶19
In essence, Google Book Search allows copyright holders to
collect revenue from digital access to a work. In some cases, digitization
will no doubt reignite interest in a forgotten work, perhaps enough to
warrant a reprinting. This new opportunity for revenue with little
additional cost on the part of the creator will in theory incentivize
copyright holders of orphan works to come forward. However, while
publishing houses with a large cache of copyrights could stand to reap a
tidy sum, it is unlikely that the majority of individual book-owners will
see much in the way of revenue, due simply to a lack of queries

48

Comment of Google, In re Orphan Works, No. 681 at 1 (Mar. 25, 2005),
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0681-Google.pdf [hereinafter
Google Comment].
49
Sergey Brin, A Library to Last Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at A31,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/opinion/09brin.html?_r=1.
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involving their book. 50 However, the fact remains that the revenue
regime constructed by Google is far more flexible than that of traditional
publishing, even given the increasing ability of publishers to print
smaller runs of books (even down to a run of one). In essence, GBS
allows “the producer to capture more of the benefit from what he
produces. . . . The higher the return to producing intellectual property the
more intellectual property will be produced.” 51 In addition, a privatized
database allows Google and copyright owners to price discriminate based
on levels of access. Access to searches and excerpts may be free, access
to an entire work may require a fee for individuals, and large commercial
or academic organizations may be charged high prices for wide-reaching
subscriptions. 52
¶20
Given the particulars of the parties involved, it is right to posit
that Google made the strategic choice to provoke a lawsuit in order to
force a unified settlement. As previously discussed, the transaction costs
for investigating the copyright status of books is prohibitively high, a
problem which is only exacerbated by the scale of the project. Once an
actual lawsuit is filed, the incentive to settle for both sides is high.
¶21
It has been argued that Google likely would have had a strong
fair use argument in the vein of its victory over Perfect 10 53, but the
actual probability of success Google might have had at trial is irrelevant,
so long as the probability was significant to give the plaintiff publishers
pause. Not pursuing a fair use argument at trial also allows Google to
negotiate additional ways of monetizing its new digital book collectionsuch as getting a cut of eventual digital book distribution. Just as
important as the perceived strength of its arguments at trial, Google’s
size and cash reserves ensure that it has the financial means to pursue the
lawsuit as far as necessary. 54 Thus, Google’s negotiating position, as
50

A comparable system is Google’s AdSense program, which allows individuals
and businesses to place Google-generated advertisements on their websites, in
exchange for a cut of the revenue. Google offers the option of “cost-per-click”
or “cost-per-1000-impressions”. For the individual advertiser, these rates tend to
be expressed in pennies, rather than dollars. See Google Adsense Help,
http://adsense.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=9902 and
http://adsense.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=21591 (last visited
March 27, 2010).
51
David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie
Cohen’s “Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help”, 13 BERKELEY TECH
L.J. 1151, 1169 (1998).
52
See id. at 1169-70.
53
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). Google
was also a party in Perfect 10.
54
Consider as points of comparison, Google’s 2008 revenue of $21 billion (on
31% growth) compared to the entire book publishing industry at $40 billion (on
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compared to a fragmented publishing industry currently in a state of flux,
is quite strong.

V. MARKET OPTIMIZATION AND THE LONG TAIL
¶22
The copyright status of a work does not guarantee profitability,
absent some market force that demands access to the work in sufficient
quantity to warrant further production. The renewal requirement of
copyright was an expression of copyright’s supporting role in the
monetization of a creative work. Absent this requirement, the public is
prevented from accessing works that have no present commercial
exploitative value, thus creating a dead-weight societal loss and
subverting the knowledge dissemination aim of copyright. Along this
vein, William Landes and Richard Posner have argued for a return to
copyright renewal practices, but with the twist of allowing near indefinite
renewal. 55 The appeal of this argument is strong: Renewals would thus
be driven by the presence of sufficient economic incentive, allowing for
the “optimal use of property rights.” In the publishing world, despite the
rise of publishing on demand and e-publishing, the cost of a new printrun for out-of-print books may still be prohibitively high 56, or at least
higher than whatever additional revenue a publisher might be able to
extract from the run. Compare this to other media, where the cost of
pressing another CD or copying another song is close to zero.57 Private
ordering can help further hone this optimization by focusing on the long
tail of out-of-print works.
¶23
Chris Anderson argues that digitization has rendered the “hitdriven” economic model obsolete. 58 Cost-revenue analysis of physical
media is calculated in groups of thousands: books are not printed unless
they will make up for the cost of producing a run, and Wal-Mart will not
sell a CD unless they believe they can sell 100,000 copies of it, in order
to cover retail overhead.59 Over half of Amazon.com’s revenue comes
from books that are not available in a brick-and-mortar bookstore, or
books that do not sell in sufficient quantities to warrant bookstore
placement. 60 The bulk of Google’s advertising revenue comes from a

1% growth). Google also sits on cash reserves of some $14 billion, enough to
purchase one of the larger publishers, McGraw Hill (market capitalization: $9.28
billion) outright.
55
See Landes and Posner, supra note 38. Landes and Posner also argue for a
higher renewal fee, so as to further crystallize the incentive calculus. Id.
56
A problem made worse the older the book is.
57
See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED, Oct. 2004,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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swarm of smaller websites and search queries, rather than from a small
group of rich repeat buyers. 61 The implication for copyrighted content is
clear: as digitization brings marginal cost close to zero and allows for
increasingly fine-tuned price discrimination, the optimal approach for
content owners is to maximize the quantity of content available for
purchase, regardless of forecasted success. 62
¶24
Long tail models reconfigure economies of scale, emphasizing
the value of aggregation above all else. Digitization minimizes the
marginal cost of production for “soft” content industries such as music,
movies, and eventually books and art by obviating the need for products
to take physical form. 63 Eventually, the only costs involved are the
logistics of database maintenance and delivery.
¶25
This economic model has two impacts. First, it lowers the barrier
for continued profitability on “back catalogues,” content that has already
been through a primary market cycle. This incentivizes rights-holders not
only to consolidate, but to advocate longer terms for rights exclusivity, in
order maximize the economic gain realizable only through large
aggregate rights holdings. Second, content creators can more cheaply
distribute their works to a wider audience due to a lower initial overhead.
However, initial costs of content creation may still be high, and the
individual creators on balance will not accumulate significant revenue in
the long tail from an individual work, especially not when compared with
the initial market cycle. 64 Nonetheless, for content-industry corporations
that hold wide back catalogues of works and rights, digitization opens the
door to this new economic style. GBS represents a market-optimizing
instance of private ordering, using near-zero marginal cost to allow
publishers to take advantage of the long tail. Google is able to use its vast
financial resources and technical expertise to implement a project that a
fragmented, low-margin publishing industry would likely not be able to
execute on its own. Perhaps just as importantly, Google is covering the
primary capital and labor overhead: the physical act of scanning and
digitizing several million books. In effect, the publishing industry is
getting a revamp of the economic engine for next to nothing. Google’s
ad-driven business model is contingent on as many users as possible

61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Anecdotally, the cost for content companies of tracking individual licensing
micro-revenues for content creators may exceed the actual revenue generated, or
the revenue may be less than the cost that an artist would have to expend in
court to retrieve lost fees. There are indications that this may already be the case
in the music industry. While this may also be resolvable through class action, it
again raises the hackles of collective action problems.
62
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being online for as long as possible. This model allows Google to
essentially give away its services, so long as it keeps users online, and
therefore on Google. This alignment of interests makes Google an ideal
partner for a digitizing publishing industry.

VI. THE IMPACT OF DIGITIZATION
Google’s approach is not without problems. Concerns have been
raised over granting Google a virtual monopoly over orphan works, or
even book digitization, given the massive barriers to entry in the form of
labor, money, and time. In essence, Google has leveraged its business
strength in one area, web search, and used it to essentially force the
cooperation of the publishing industry. These antitrust concerns, while
worthy of discussion, are beyond the scope of this note. More pressing
here is the potential for Google’s incentive program to lead to an ironic
inversion of copyright law. This manifests in two arenas: fair use and the
public domain.
¶26

¶27
First, GBS can contractually circumvent fair use. By allowing
content owners to determine the size of the excerpts that surround a
search query, a potential user may be forced to pay for more complete
access. This problem is most profound with regards to rarer works and
scholarly research, especially ones for which paper copies may be in
exceedingly poor condition. The transaction costs of securing access to a
rare work are unfairly reallocated to the copyright holder. Further, the
possibility of perfect price discrimination with regards to use and access
restrictions to a work may eventually undermine the fair use defense, due
to the presence of a readily available licensing market.
¶28
Fair use exists as a result of the market’s failure to foster socially
desirable uses of copyrighted works. Rights-holders have little incentive
to selectively yield their copyright, particularly when these uses may
paint their original work in a negative or undesirable light. Fair use is an
attempt to prevent monopolies on certain expression from shrinking First
Amendment protections, as well as to foster the practices of criticism and
academic study, which ultimately maximizes a given work’s contribution
to the overall knowledge base.

Second, GBS threatens to further slow the flow of books into the
public domain. While the settlement explicitly excludes public domain
works, a significant tactical question arises for rightsholders when book
copyrights expire and enter the public domain. It would be in the public
interest for Google to then provide open access to that particular book, at
no charge, and indeed it is questionable whether Google would have to
continue paying the copyright holder at all for continued use of the work.
While the benefits of this strategy are unclear, it is possible that
publishing houses might try to leverage permission for books they do
¶29
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still control in order to maintain revenue streams on books that they once
controlled. Such a deadlock could threaten to undermine the entire
system. A compromise could be reached by opening up access and
continuing to split the advertising revenue. However, this is reliant on
Google pushing for open access as works enter the public domain, an
uncertain proposition, although it seems likely that universities would
advocate for an increase in the public domain. Otherwise, there is a
social loss in the form of a smaller public domain.
¶30
To a point, such harms are speculative. However, the question
raised is significant: Does private ordering undermine copyright policy?
If copyright law is merely a matter of market optimization by means of
maximum renumeration for creators, surely a private ordering system is
ideal, particularly with the advent of micropayments and electronic
transaction costs that near zero. Indeed, there is a strong argument for
reframing copyright in this context, particularly given the dependence of
the American economy on copyright-protected exports.

VII. PRIVATE ORDERING
¶31
Private ordering manifests itself in a knowledge-based economy,
where the boundaries between industry and market segment are fluid and
easily surmounted. Apple, Google, and Microsoft are so successful
precisely because of their ability to transcend these industry boundaries.
This fluidity means that rivals in one market segment may be allies in
another—Google’s YouTube and Maps services are prominently
featured on the iPhone, even while Google launches a competing
smartphone operating system. It also requires a new understanding of
how these actors will interact across market segments. Public choice
theory presumes that social actors have fixed interests, and that they do
not need to make complex judgments to determine how their interests
can be advanced. It also does not explain how nonmaterial motivations
and resources affect collective action. 65 Private ordering in the
information economy is then primarily an issue of framing.
¶32
Outside of copyright, private ordering is already a highly
prevalent phenomenon—most legal disputes in the U.S. are resolved
without “intervention of the public legal process.” 66 In intellectual
property, private ordering is on the rise, most notably in the management
of patent licensing. 67 Private ordering is simply good business.

65

Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 824.
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¶33
It is important to note that private ordering is not ignorant of the
current state of the law, nor does it necessarily seek to change existing
law. Law has a gravitational pull, and shapes the existing discourse.
Mobilizations in response to law may serve to strengthen existing law,
rather than unsettle it. Niva Elkin-Koren’s critique of Creative Commons
is structured along similar lines, arguing that the use of a licensing tool,
“of property rights, backed up by contract, is bound to entail a logic of
exclusion,” and strengthens the conception of information as private
property. 68 Framing shifts are shifts in discourse, and in that sense, even
the term “intellectual property” represents a shift, introducing the term
property as an umbrella description of copyright, trademark, and patent.
Property, unlike patent, trademark, and copyright, lacks an expiration
date, and implies an entitlement in perpetuity. Any debate on copyright
term extensions is now framed in a context of property protection. Thus,
rather than a discussion beginning from the analysis of what is best for
the ostensible knowledge advancement ends of copyright, the default
shifts to center around the value of private property preservation. This
shift is made easier because it aligns with already engrained marketbased value frameworks. Discourse framing can alter the value criteria of
copyright debate and legislation, thus changing the status quo bias in
such a way that will benefit the debate’s winner. Content industries have
used framing to their advantage, justifying term extensions with the
rhetoric of preventing property loss, crucial to economic engines.69
¶34
Intellectual property battles are fought by shifting groups,
defined generally as “users of information and as afflicted by a similar
set of problems that could be expressed . . . in terms of intellectual
property and information economics and structures of innovation.” 70
Similar groups were formed by the so-called “content industries”, who
forged an originally uneasy alliance based on “forging a common
identity as intellectual property industries, and by framing the use of their

http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1813&co
ntext=fac_pubs.
68
Severine Dusollier, Contract Options for Individual Artists: Master's Tools v.
The Master's House: Creative Commons v. Copyright, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
271, 283 (2006) (quoting NIVA ELKIN-KOREN, A PUBLIC-REGARDING
APPROACH TO CONTRACTING OVER COPYRIGHTS, IN EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 192 (R.C. Dreyfuss, D. L.
Zimmerman & H. First eds. 2001)).
69
It is interesting to also note that entertainment companies have generally been
the most successful in their lobbying, perhaps because it is easier to
conceptually separate Mickey Mouse and company from the conception of
“knowledge” that the Copyright Clause looks to promote.
70
Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 863-64.
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products without permission as ‘theft.’” 71 The conceptual battle is then
between framing intellectual property as a knowledge advancement issue
or a freedom of speech issue, and framing intellectual property as an
“indispensable tool of modern economic management.” 72
From a knowledge policy standpoint, Google’s financial might
combined with the interests of its partner libraries has created a bloc
strong enough to impact orphan works policy. 73
¶35

If or when an eventual settlement does coagulate, it will be the
most prominent recent example of the private ordering phenomenon in
copyright law. In essence, “[p]rivate ordering operates when the rulemaking process regarding the use of information is privatized, and the
legal power to define the boundaries of public access to information is
delegated to private parties.”74 Such a system resembles one of real
property rights wrapped in contractual protection, and could serve to
further weaken copyright as a tool of knowledge advancement in favor of
a conception grounded in real property rules.
¶36

VIII. DIGITAL LIBRARIES AND DIGITAL LOCKS
Private ordering is not a counterbalance to framing momentum.
Rather, private ordering seeks to maximize economic benefit from within
a given frame. In turn, this maximizes the economic activity dependant
on that intellectual model. Ultimately, the cost of multiple changes in
private alignment incentivizes pressure groups to lobby for legislative
framings that help maintain benefits they currently enjoy. Legislative
reluctance to upset the status quo of good business further entrenches
such framing. Here, GBS threatens to cement existing conceptions of
copyright law as primarily remunerative in function, and founded in the
same roots as real property rights. GBS has the opportunity to seed an
expansive digital public domain, but the rights-holders they negotiate
with have incentive to maximize digital rights protection in order to
leverage the long tail benefits of aggregated rights holdings. The
resulting economic model has serious implications for copyright law.
¶37

A. The Long Tail and Author Incentive
¶38
The long tail does not provide additional incentive to authors for
work creation. Consider that the value of the long-tail is in aggregation.
71
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While digitization may marginally bolster the demand of some works
over the long term (and in rare cases, reinvigorate demand), the model
for individual works is still the same as it is in most content fields, with
the overwhelming majority of revenue being made on the initial print
runs. After all, if a book is not sufficiently in demand to warrant
continued printing, there is little reason to think that GBS will suddenly
result in a windfall for potential authors.75
¶39
Google is consolidating and assuming the risk of liability on
orphan works through the use of an opt-out settlement, and hopes to
mitigate that risk with the carrot of digital revenue. To that end, it is
unclear if the long tail is sufficient on an individual level to induce
owners of orphan works to come out of the woodwork. Surely, any
positive amount of revenue is better than none at all, but owners of
orphan works in some cases may not even know that they are the rightful
copyright holder—for instance, small estates or since-merged publishing
companies—and the cost involved in determining whether or not they are
entitled to any revenue may exceed the actual revenue itself. This in
itself may not be problematic for the public domain. Scholars can still
access works whose owners have not shown up to remove them from the
system, and an orphan work in GBS is virtually in the public domain if
no one ever claims it, aside from Google having control of the digital
copy.

Thus, if digitization does not provide sufficient consistent
revenue to induce the creation of additional works, the benefits are
confined to remuneration. The danger of rent-seeking from a GBS
settlement is extremely high. Given both the aforementioned ambiguity
in old contractual arrangements between publishers and authors as well
as the relatively low revenue for each individual author compared to the
potentially high aggregate revenue of a large publishing portfolio,
publishers are incentivized to claim copyright on as many works as
possible, including works to which they have at best dubious claims.
Again, the proceedings to prove the contrary may be more costly than
any expected benefit for individual authors. This ambiguity is
exacerbated by the complete lack of contractual language regarding
digital and e-book rights for older books. 76 This is again endemic of
¶40
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private ordering, which rather than seeking to revise ambiguities or
problems in current legislative structure, instead looks to each party to
maximize their economic return through contract, for better or for ill.
Here, publishers are able to advantage the ambiguous contractual market
for out of print books, at the cost of author compensation and incentive.

B. Remuneration and Knowledge
¶41
Private ordering is an economically optimizing phenomenon, and
as such, is ignorant of the non-economic impacts such ordering may
have. In essence, copyright law uses economic means to promote noneconomic ends – the constitutionally enumerated “Progress of Science
and useful Arts.” 77 Thus, any additional economic controls are only
useful to copyright to the extent that it continues to further promote
progress. It is the duty of Congress to determine the optimal balance of
inducement and open access in order to encourage new writings and
discovery. This balance is justified by the understanding that copyrighted
works are not created in a vacuum, and that progress nearly always
builds upon previous works.
¶42
Thus, it might be suggested that any additional protection
beyond what is necessary to induce new work is detrimental to copyright
and to progress. By maximizing economic remuneration for aggregate
rights holders while failing to significantly contribute to the inducement
of new work creation, private ordering may create social waste. The ripe
opportunity for rent-seeking with digital projects such as GBS suggests
that on the whole, copyright holders could take more from the public
domain than they contribute.
¶43
Private ordering is unable to mitigate an overbearing copyright
scheme. While in the aggregate it may breathe new life into orphan
works, this comes at the cost of increased incentives for large rightsholders to remonetize forgotten works in order to maximize their longtail revenue. Further, publishers now have renewed incentive to join the
pressure groups of the other large content-industries in pushing for
increasing copyright term extensions, because digitization now enables
them to continue benefitting from even unpopular older works.

A possible counterweight here may be university libraries who
are offering their collections for scan and use. While is possible that
libraries will push for works to become digitally free for access by
anyone once the copyrights expire, the amount of leverage they have is
likely small, as libraries do not own copyrights. In fact, libraries may
eventually be cut out of the project as publishers move to contribute
digital versions of the books they both currently print and printed in the
¶44
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past. Rightsholders will also certainly balk at Google continuing to
collect ad revenue from queries for books to their books that enter the
public domain.
¶45
Private ordering is incapable of addressing the underlying issues
with the present state of copyright law, and in particular it is unable to
resolve copyright’s non-economic goals. Here, although private ordering
has almost inadvertently managed to work around orphan works, it has
also incentivized rent-seeking and threatens the public domain.

IX. IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE?
Economic efficiency is ultimately a strong variable in
determining appropriate policy. Landes and Posner suggest a novel
approach to optimizing economic efficiency in copyright: shortening
copyright terms, increasing fees for term renewal, and allowing nearindefinite renewal. 78 Basing their argument on historical data, they argue
that the amount of renewed copyrights under this sort of system would be
a “tiny fraction” of all copyrights. 79 Landes and Posner analogize to
trademark in order to suggest that indefinite copyright renewals “need
not starve the public domain.” 80 In theory, this allows for a self-sorting
market in that those works determined by their authors to still have
exploitable value are renewed, while those that are not are free to the
public domain. 81
¶46

¶47
Digitization has zeroed the cost of additional distribution.
Consider that prior to a digital model, book copyright holders in Landes
and Posner’s world would have had to account for the cost of publishing
a new run of books—however small—,in addition to the cost of
renewing the copyright, and whether the profit would outweigh these
costs. 82 With GBS, rights-holders essentially make the bet that they will
collect at least the renewal fee in access and ad micropayments over the
term of the copyright. Landes and Posner suggest ten year terms for
copyright renewal, and even with a fee of several hundred dollars, this
might be a feasible proposition for many more books. The question of
projected profitability does not change, but the additional costs incurred
to distribute the work are now next to nothing, meaning the potential
range of copyright protected works may be much broader under this
model, ultimately harming the public domain.
78
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¶48
Landes and Posner dismiss public-goods problems, essentially
arguing that without any copyright protection, there is no incentive to
maintain existing works, leading to inefficiencies such as congestion
externalities. 83 Here, framing comes into play, as Google and its partner
libraries actually do have incentive to maintain digital book databases
that are inclusive of public domain works, for both search ad revenue and
general institutional missions. Further, copyright over-protection is
similarly inefficient, as the orphan works problem erects barriers
preventing those who actually wish to exploit the work from doing so.
¶49
Landes and Posner provide a potentially novel approach that
emphasizes private ordering to achieve economically optimal results and
prevent orphan works issues. However, the declining marginal costs of
digitization still incentivizes publishers to use digital locks to control
both works they own and works they do not. Regardless of the copyright
model, the economic incentives involved raise the question as to the
feasibility of a public domain in the digital era.

CONCLUSIONS
¶50
Are the incomplete solutions of private ordering the best ones we
can hope for? The overwhelming pressure group imbalance, coupled
with an endowment bias, makes the reversal of existing term extensions
an unlikely prospect. However, this does not preclude an evolving
conception of intellectual property and its corresponding values. How
then will the underlying problems of copyright law be solved? It may be
that private ordering can indirectly provide a solution. GBS could prove
to be a catalyzing event for critics of current intellectual property policy
as it brings the negative impacts of excessive term limits to the political
front burner.
¶51
The so-called “access to knowledge” movement is pushing for
new models to govern the flow of information-based goods, and has so
far primarily gained steam in the international development context. 84
The sheer volume of academic and policy discussion generated as a
result of the GBS settlement only makes it more likely that actors will
coalesce into a strong movement for improved information policies. It
may be then that private ordering provides a cognizable frame of
reference for groups to react to. This is not to understate the level of
resistance that this new potential movement would be facing. Private
ordering is already causing publishing interests to reframe the direction
of their advocacy, much like a budding social movement, and surely they
will push hard to keep this new potential long-term source of revenue.
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Private ordering, then, is best seen as perhaps just another pull in the
ongoing policy tug-of-war, albeit one that shakes more individuals into
action.
¶52
Is a public domain possible in the digital era? Surely the
newfound ease of distribution would suggest an answer in the
affirmative. However, in order to maximize the benefit of the
information age, it is imperative that we succeed in preserving as much
knowledge as possible before it disintegrates. In that process, we have
the opportunity to undo the wasteful traps preventing orphan works from
being fully utilized and built upon. It is critical that in taking advantage
of this opportunity, we are careful not to erect larger, more complex
barriers to access, and refrain from sacrificing the progress ends of
copyright to digital revenue’s ever-growing long tail.

